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I. INTRODUCTION
Something curious is happening in global copyright law. At the
end of the twentieth century, the Fair Use Doctrine was an
idiosyncratic feature of American law.1 This doctrine, that permits
*Patrick R. Goold, Qualcomm Postdoctoral Fellow in Private Law and IP, Harvard
Law School. For their comments on this project, the author would like to thank:
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copying of copyrighted works without the owner’s permission for
certain “fair” uses, appeared on the statue books of no nation other
than the U.S.A.2 But today the landscape of global copyright is
changing.3 Since 2000, Israel,4 South Korea,5 the Philippines,6 Sri
Lanka,7 and more, have adopted this erstwhile American doctrine.
Canada modified its existing Fair Dealing defense to resemble Fair
Use.8 Australia9 and Ireland10 may be poised to follow suit after law
reform commissions recommended their respective legislatures adopt
Fair Use to facilitate growth in the “digital economy.” The United
Kingdom, finding Fair Use to be helpful for ensuring flexibility in
copyright doctrine, would perhaps have adopted the defense if it
were not for the lingering concern that doing so might breach
European copyright norms.11 Once viewed as a quirk of U.S. law, the
Oren Bracha, Graeme Dinwoodie, Sean Flynn, Janet Freilich, Henning Grosse
Ruse-Khan, Dmitry Karshtedt, Martin Senftleben, Peter Yu, the participants of the
American University, Washington College of Law Symposium on Globalizing Fair
Use, and the editors of the American University International Law Review.
1. Peter Decherney, Fair Use Goes Global, 31 CRITICAL STUD. IN MEDIA
COMM. 146, 146 (2014) (stating that “[f]or 150 years, fair use was a solely
American doctrine.”).
2. See 17 U.S.C. §107 (2017).
3. See Richard J. Peltz, Global Warming Trend? The Creeping Indulgence of
Fair Use in International Copyright Law?, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 267, 267-68
(2009) (stating that “[t]he concept has escaped its disfavored status as a U.S.
peculiarity and achieved some traction in international legal circles.”).
4. Copyright Act, 2007-19 (Isr.) [hereinafter Israel Copyright Act].
5. [Copyright Act], Act. No. 432, 2011, amended by Act. No. 12137, 35ter (S.
Kor.) [hereinafter South Korean Copyright Act].
6. An Act Prescribing the Intellectual Property Code and Establishing the
Intellectual Property Office, Providing for Its Powers and Functions, and for Other
Purposes, Rep. Act. No. 8293, §185 (1998) (Phil.) [hereinafter Philippines
Intellectual Property Code].
7. Intellectual Property Act §12 (Act No. 36 of 2003) (Sri Lanka) [hereinafter
Sri Lanka Intellectual Property Act].
8. Michael Geist, Fairness Found: How Canada Quietly Shifted from Fair
Dealing to Fair Use, in THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT
OF CANADA SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 157-186
(Michael Geist ed., 2013).
9. Australian Law Reform Commission, Copyright and the Digital Economy,
ALRC Report 122, November 2013, paras 11.77-11.84.
10. COPYRIGHT REV. COMM., COPYRIGHT AND INNOVATION, A CONSULTATION
PAPER 89 (2012) (Ir.), http://www.djei.ie/science/ipr/crc_consultation_paper.pdf.
11. See IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GROWTH 44-46 (2011) (discussing the benefits and
challenges associated with adopting Fair Use in the UK).
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Fair Use doctrine now presents an opportunity for many countries to
promote efficient and fair copyright law in the Information Age. The
question on the minds of lawmakers is: Does the Fair Use doctrine
comply with the requirements of international copyright law?
The Fair Use doctrine’s legitimacy is determined by international
copyright law’s “Three-Step Test,” but the interpretation of this
provision is viciously contested. 12 International copyright law
permits states to enact copyright exceptions and limitations only in
“certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the author.”13 Broadly, this provision is subject
to two diverging interpretations: the so-called “Traditional” and
“Balanced” Interpretations.14 The Traditional Interpretation claims
the purpose of international copyright law is to increase worldwide
copyright standards and to ensure copyright owners a high level of
legal protection.15 The Three-Step Test provision is therefore
interpreted restrictively and thus narrows down the array of
exceptions and limitations that a state may enact.16 Under this
interpretation, the Fair Use doctrine exempts too much copying and
is too unpredictable to pass the Test.17 By contrast, the Balanced
Interpretation emphasizes that international copyright law’s purpose
is to appropriately balance the interests of copyright owners and
wider society.18 Creators require some copyright protection to ensure
a fair reward for their labor and to preserve their creative incentives.
However, the interests of copyright owners must be balanced against
the interest of wider society in accessing copyrighted material. The
goal of international copyright law is, therefore, to guarantee that
states provide a minimum level of copyright protection, while
simultaneously permitting states to enact exceptions and limitations
that are in the broader social interest. The Three-Step Test is the
12. See infra Part II.
13. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art.
9(2), Sept. 9, 1886, 331 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; see also
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 13, Jan. 1,
1995, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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fulcrum of this balancing project; and the Fair Use doctrine is
generally seen to pass the Balanced Interpretation of the Test.19
National lawmakers, therefore, cite the Balanced Interpretation as
evidence that enacting Fair Use will not breach international
obligations.
This Essay analyzes the Balanced Interpretation of the Three-Step
Test. Advocates of the Balanced Interpretation make a bold
doctrinal argument: When the Three-Step Test is “correctly”
interpreted, the Balanced Interpretation is the legitimate description
of states’ legal obligations.20 Supporters of the Traditional
Interpretation criticize this claim. Traditionalists argue that the
Balanced Interpretation cannot be the right interpretation of the
Three-Step Test because it contradicts an important WTO panel
19. Id.
20. Some commentators have characterized this argument as a “Legal Realist”
argument, see e.g. Jerome H. Reichman & Ruth L. Okediji, When Copyright Law
and Science Collide: Empowering Digitally Integrated Research Methods on a
Global Scale, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1362, 1455 (2012) (praising the Balanced
Interpretation for introducing “a healthy dose of legal realism into the traditional
positivism surrounding European copyright jurisprudence”). If by “realism” such
commentators simply mean that the authors of the Balanced Interpretation
recognize a connection between law and politics, then there is no serious problem
in calling the Balanced Interpretation’s argument “realist.” However, labeling this
argument as a Realist argument would conflict somewhat with how the “Realism”
and “Formalism” terms typically are used in legal philosophy literature. In this
literature, “Realism” and “Formalism” are theories of adjudication. Formalism
stands for the belief that laws can be applied by a judge to determine a uniquely
correct answer to a question of law; Realism by contrast argues that laws are
indeterminate and thus to decide questions of law, judges necessarily need recourse
to non-legal concerns. See e.g. HLA HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-154 (2012,
3d ed); Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138,
1144-1153 (1999). If we adopt this terminology, then the arguments advanced by
many supporters of the Balanced Interpretation are Formalist: the argument they
offer is that there is a correct legal interpretation of the Three-Step Test, i.e. the
Balanced Interpretation, and that those adopting an alternative interpretation
(including WTO panels), such as the more traditionalist interpretation, are making
some form of legal error. Furthermore, as discussed below, infra Part II.C., this
position is open to the usual criticism leveled against Formalist claims, i.e. that
such arguments are merely masks for hidden normative judgments. By contrast, a
“Realist” argument would be to say the Three-Step Test has no determinate
meaning, and that interpreting the test requires the interpreter to have recourse to
some form of extra-legal considerations (such as normative value). It is the
Formalist claim made on behalf of the Balanced Interpretation that this Essay
examines.
ss

ridan Pre

The She

2017]

THE INTERPRETIVE ARGUMENT

191

report – one of the few authorities to interpret the Three-Step Test’s
meaning – and is inconsistent with some of the intentions of the
international copyright lawmakers who originally drafted the
provision.21 Traditionalists argue that the Balanced Interpretation is
therefore not really an interpretation at all, but a disguised normative
argument and reform proposal. The question, therefore, is: Can the
doctrinal claim made in support of the Balanced Interpretation be
defended against this critique? Note, the question is not which
interpretation is simply the most normatively attractive? Nor is the
question, given the vagueness and ambiguity of the Three-Step
Test’s wording, which interpretation ought judges or national
policymakers, in their discretion, to adopt? Instead, this Essay takes
seriously the claim, made by the Balanced Interpretation’s
supporters, that the Balanced Interpretation is the correct legal
interpretation of the Three-Step Test, and asks whether this can be
defended in light of the traditionalist criticism.
This Essay argues that in order to defend the Balanced
Interpretation’s doctrinal claim, then one must adopt some version
of, what this Essay calls, the “Interpretive Argument.”22 Broadly,
jurists divide into three schools on the issue of treaty interpretation:
textualist, intentionalist, and teleological.23 It is hard to defend the
doctrinal claims made on behalf of the Balanced Interpretation on the
grounds of textualism or intentionalism: the ordinary meaning of the
treaty wording is too ambiguous to provide conclusive support for
the Balanced Interpretation; and arguably the drafters of the original
Three-Step Test intended a more restrictive provision than that
envisioned by the Balanced Interpretation. If the Balanced
Interpretation is to be proclaimed the correct interpretation, then it
must rest on a more teleological approach to treaty interpretation
which favors the provision’s “purpose” over text and intent.24
Within the realm of teleological approaches to legal interpretation,
strongest support for the Balanced Interpretation comes from a
teleological approach found more commonly at the national level:

21.
22.
23.
24.

See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.A.
Id.
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Legal Interpretivism.25 Legal Interpretivism – developed primarily by
Ronald Dworkin – argues that law is not merely a social construct,
but is a partly moral enterprise. Therefore, when interpreting the
content of law on a given issue (whether that be construing a line of
cases, interpreting a statute, or indeed reading a treaty provision),
one must take into account the most normatively defensible purpose
justifying the relevant area of law. Legal interpretation is thus a
creative process whereby lawyers aim to produce a “constructive
interpretation” guided by underlying normative principles. 26 The
goal of such a creative process is ultimately to find the interpretation
which shows the provision in its “best light.” 27
When viewed through an Interpretivist lens, the doctrinal claim
made by supporters of the Balanced Interpretation is at its most
persuasive.28 The most normatively defensible purpose of
international copyright law is that such regulation harmonizes
national copyright standards in a way that will balance the rights of
owners and users in order to maximize society’s interests. From the
standpoint of Legal Interpretivism, this justification must therefore
be used as the guiding light when interpreting the Three-Step Test,
and ambiguities in the text must be resolved in a way that favors this
purpose. On Interpretivist grounds therefore, the Balanced
Interpretation is arguably the correct interpretation of the Three-Step
Test, because only this interpretation gives effect to the most
normatively defensible purposes of international copyright law, and
thus presents the Test in its “best light.”
The significance of the Interpretive Argument is three-fold. First,
if persuasive, it supports the claim that the Balanced Interpretation is
the correct legal interpretation of the Three- Step Test. Second, the
Interpretative Argument enables a rational response to some
traditionalist criticisms.29 For example, in response to the
traditionalist claim that the Balanced Interpretation is really a
disguised normative reform proposal, supporters of the Balanced
25. Id.
26. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 45-87 (1986).
27. Id. at 90 (stating that theories of law “try to show legal practice as a whole
in its best light, to achieve equilibrium between legal practice as they find it and
the best justification of that practice.”).
28. See infra Part III.B.
29. Id.
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Interpretation could counter argue that they are not proposing legal
reform, but instead re-aligning the Test’s interpretation to conform to
the normative values justifying international copyright law as a
whole. In response to the traditionalist argument that the Balanced
Interpretation does not fit some aspects of the WTO panel report, or
the intentions of some of the drafters, supporters of the Balanced
Interpretation could counter-argue that the right interpretation need
not be consistent with all aspects of the Test’s history in order to be,
overall, the interpretation most capable of showing the Test in its
“best light.” And third, by introducing the Interpretive Argument,
this Essay clarifies and highlights the methodological and
jurisprudential commitments of the supporters of this interpretation.30
Note, however, what is not riding on the strength of the
Interpretive Argument. If one finds the Interpretive Argument
unpersuasive, and thus presumably that the Balanced Interpretation’s
doctrinal claim fails, then one could still legitimately claim either: (i)
that the Balanced Interpretation presents the most normatively
attractive vision for the Three-Step Test and that states have the
freedom to alter international copyright norms to adopt this new rule
(the Normative Argument); or (ii) that, given the Three-Step Test’s
wording and history are indeterminate, the Balanced Interpretation is
one of many legitimate doctrinal interpretations from which judges
and national policy makers could, in their discretion, choose to adopt
as they prefer (the Discretion Argument).31
The Essay is in three parts: Part II summarizes the debate
regarding the interpretation of the Three-Step Test. It introduces the
so-called “Traditional” and “Balanced” Interpretations, and explains
how they apply to the question of Fair Use. This Essay adopts the
terms “Traditional” and “Balanced” because these terms reflect how
supporters perceive these interpretations. The “Traditional”
Interpretation, for example, is so-named here, not because it is
necessarily more traditional, but because its advocates often claim
that it is. Part III introduces the “Interpretive Argument” to support
the Balanced Interpretation. Finally, Part IV considers challenges to
the Interpretive Argument, and briefly develops the alternative
Normative Argument and Discretion Argument.
30. Id.
31. See infra Part IV.
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II. TRADITIONAL VERSUS BALANCED
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE THREE-STEP TEST
May a state adopt a Fair Use doctrine without breaching
international copyright obligations? The answer depends on whether
the Fair Use doctrine passes the “Three-Step Test.” Sadly, there is
little consensus on what the Three-Step Test requires. Part I of this
Essay summarizes the so-called “Traditional” and “Balanced”
Interpretations of the Three-Step Test and their respective answers
on the question of Fair Use’s legitimacy. Part I then describes an
important criticism of the Balanced Interpretation.

A. DOES FAIR USE PASS THE THREE-STEP TEST?
The “Three-Step Test” determines what copyright exceptions and
limitations states may enact.32 The Berne Convention on Literary and
Artistic Works, first signed in 1886, requires all member states to
give authors an exclusive legal right to reproduce their expressive
works.33 In 1967, the parties revised the Convention to include a
provision determining what exceptions and limitations to the authors’
reproduction right would be permitted.34 Article 9(2) of the Berne
Convention, now known as the Three-Step Test, states:
It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit
the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such
reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work, and
does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.35

The international community further embedded the Three-Step
Test into international copyright law in the 1990s. To join the World
Trade Organization, states are required to ratify the 1994 Agreement

32. See JANE GINSBURG & SAM RICKETSON, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 759-783 (2010)
(providing commentary on Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention).
33. Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. 9.
34. Id.
35. Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. 9(2).
ss
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on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS).36 Article
13 of TRIPS states that member states shall “confine limitations . . .
[to]exclusive rights . . . [and] certain special cases which do not
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.”37
Accordingly, the Three-Step Test determines not only how states
may limit an author’s right of reproduction, but rather restricts how
states may limit any authorial right, including rights to distribute,
adapt, perform, or display a work. Finally, in 1996, the Three-Step
Test was also included in the World Intellectual Property
Organization’s “Internet Treaties,” designed to regulate copyright in
the digital age. 38
The Fair Use Doctrine is a limit to copyright protection.39 Fair Use
permits the copying of an expressive work without the copyright
owner’s consent provided that the copying and subsequent use of the
expressive work is “fair.” 40 What qualifies as a “fair” use is not
precisely defined. Rather the concept of “fair use” is left deliberately
vague.41 Through the twentieth-century only the U.S.A. adopted this
unique copyright limitation.42 The Fair Use doctrine originated in the
1841 case of Folsom v Marsh,43 and was later codified in §107 of the
U.S. Copyright Act 1976.44 This section provides some illustrative
examples of uses that may be “fair,” including research, teaching,
criticism, and related uses.45 It also provides a non-exhaustive list of
36. TRIPS, supra note 13.
37. Id.
38. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, art 10., Dec.
20, 1996, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty]. ; see also WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 16, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S.
203 [hereinafter WPPT].
39. 17 U.S.C. §107.
40. Id.
41. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976) (“there is no disposition to freeze the
doctrine in the statute”); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 584 (1994) (“Congress resisted attempts to narrow the ambit of this traditional
enquiry by adopting categories of presumptively fair use, and it urged courts to
preserve the breadth of their traditionally ample view of the universe of relevant
evidence.”).
42. Decherney, supra note 1, at 146 (“[f]or 150 years, fair use was a solely
American doctrine.”).
43. 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
44. 17 U.S.C. §107.
45. Id.
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factors that judges ought to consider when determining whether a use
is fair: the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the
copyrighted work, the amount of expression copied, and the effect of
the copying upon the market or value for the original work.46 By
leaving the “fairness” concept vague, the law retains flexibility to
keep pace with technological change. Under the doctrine, judges can
hold new, technology-enabled uses to be non-infringing “fair” uses,
even though Congress did not envision these uses when it passed the
1976 Copyright Act. Since the codification, judges have held many
new uses to be fair, including time-shifting of television programs,47
caching of Internet websites by search engines,48 creating digital
libraries for limited public access,49 and reverse engineering of
computer code,50 to give just a few examples.51
Today many states are adopting this erstwhile American doctrine.
Historically, civil law countries allowed the use of copyrighted
material without permission only in a small number of precisely
defined situations.52 Section VI of the German Copyright Act, for
example, lists 18 permitted “free uses,”53 such as the making of
“transient or incidental” copies as part of a “technical process”54 and
copying “limited parts of works” on a “small scale” for use by
schools on a non-commercial basis.55 These limits to copyright are
more precise than the Fair Use approach but also less flexible.
Lacking a specific statutory provision, judges faced with new,
technologically-enabled uses cannot easily hold such use to be noninfringing.56 Other common law countries adopt a mid-way “Fair
Dealing” solution.57 Fair Dealing countries allow users to copy a
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 418 (1984).
Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1107 (D. Nev. 2006).
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 229 (2d Cir. 2015).
Sega Enterprise Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
For greater discussion, see Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2619 (2009).
52. See Samuel Ricketson, WIPO Study on Limitations and Exceptions of
Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Environment, 67-73 SCCR/9/7 (Apr.
5, 2003) (comparing “closed list” and other approaches to copyright exceptions).
53. Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG][Copyright Act], § 6 (Ger.).
54. Id.
55. Id. at § 44a.
56. Id. at § 46.
57. LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 223
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work without permission provided the copying is in aid of some
exclusive, statutorily defined purposes.58 For example, the U.K.
allows “fair dealing” with copyrighted works for purposes of noncommercial research, study, criticism, review, or news reporting.59
The Fair Dealing approach is thus more limited than the Fair Use
approach because the number of uses that may be permitted is
limited to a small class of purposes, although judges have flexibility
to decide what constitutes a “fair” amount of copying for those
purposes.60 Still, in the current information age, many countries have
perceived the need for greater flexibility in their domestic copyright
law. To ensure their law keeps pace with technological change,
countries such as Israel,61 South Korea,62 and Philippines63 have
adopted Fair Use doctrines, while others like Australia64 and Ireland65
have recommended its adoption. Other jurisdictions, such as the
U.K.66 and the E.U.,67 are considering Fair Use but have, so far, only
recommended trying to recreate the flexibility of Fair Use within
their existing legal frameworks.68
(2014); see also Giuseppina D’Agostino, Healing Fair Dealing? A Comparative
Copyright Analysis of Canada’s Fair Dealing to U.K. Fair Dealing and U.S. Fair
Use, 53 MCGILL L.J. 309, 312-14 (2008).
58. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act ¶ 29-30 (1988) (Eng.).
59. Id.
60. BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 57, at 224 (stating that “[t]he restricted
approach adopted in the United Kingdom should be contrasted with US copyright
law, which has a general defense of fair use such that if the court is satisfied that
the use is fair, then there will be no infringement.”); see also JONATHAN BAND &
JONATHAN GERAFI, THE FAIR USE/FAIR DEALING HANDBOOK (2013),
http://infojustice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/band-and-gerafi-2013.pdf
(extrapolating on the evolution of fair use statutes).
61. Israel Copyright Act § 19.
62. South Korean Copyright Act § 35ter.
63. Philippines Intellectual Property Code § 185 (providing fair use protections
for comment, criticism, reporting, and teaching based on copyrighted works).
64. See Copyright and the Digital Economy, ALRC Report 122, paras 11.7711.84 (highlighting the Australian Law Reform Commission’s endorsement of fair
use protections for use of copyright material for non-expressive purposes).
65. See COPYRIGHT REV. COMM., supra note 10, at 89 (discussing whether a
US-style Fair Use doctrine would be appropriate for Ireland).
66. See HARGREAVES, supra note 11, at 45-46.
67. P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & MARTIN R.F. SENFTLEBEN, FAIR USE IN EUROPE:
IN
SEARCH
OF
FLEXIBILITIES
2-4
(2012),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2013239.
68. See HARGREAVES, supra note 11, at 5 (arguing that adopting Fair Use
would be unfeasible in the U.K. and that the U.K. can achieve many of these
ss

ridan Pre

The She

198

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[33:1

Therefore, the question is: Does the Fair Use doctrine pass the
Three-Step Test? May a country enact a U.S. style Fair Use doctrine
consistent with its obligation to allow copyright exceptions only in
“certain special cases?” Lawmakers have yet to clearly articulate an
answer to this question. In 1967, the U.S. was not party to the Berne
Convention. While the U.S. was present at the Revision Conference,
very few references are made in the official documents to “Fair Use,”
none of which explain what the drafters thought regarding the
legality of the doctrine under the new standard.69 The de-restricted
documents from the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations leading to
TRIPS similarly contain only scattered references to the doctrine.70
When the U.S. joined the Berne Convention in 1989, it was certainly
not forced to abandon the Fair Use doctrine,71 but nor was the
doctrine explicitly endorsed as passing the Test. Later in 1996, when
the parties ratified TRIPS, the European Community (“E.C.”),
Australia, and New Zealand each questioned the U.S. on the
legitimacy of Fair Use doctrine under the Three-Step Test.72 The U.S.
benefits under existing E.U. law); HUGENHOLTZ & SENFTLEBEN, supra note 67, at
29.
69. See e.g. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, RECORDS OF
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CONFERENCE OF STOCKHOLM 860, 978 (1967)
[hereinafter WIPO Stockholm Records]. (highlighting when discussion of the
reproduction of copyrighted materials for news reporting hinted at Fair Use).
70. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Meeting of Negotiating Group 1214 September 1988, GATT Doc. MTN.GNC/NG11/9, 8 (Oct. 13, 1988)
[hereinafter Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Intellectual Property 1]; see also
Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Existence, Scope and Form of Generally
Internationally Accepted and Applied Standards/Norms for the Protection of
Intellectual Property, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/24, 23 (May 5, 1988)
[hereinafter Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Intellectual Property 2]
(explaining commonly applied national provisions within copyright law).
71. The U.S. joined the Berne Convention by enacting the Berne Convention
Implementation Act Pub.L. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853. For discussion of the US
accession to the Berne Convention and Fair Use, see Ruth Okediji, Toward an
International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 105 (2000)
(noting that the United States did not change this aspect of domestic law, although
other parts of domestic law were changed).
72. See, e.g., Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Review of Legislation on Copyright and Related Rights United States,
WTO Doc. IP/Q/USA/1 at 2, 4, 18 (Oct. 30, 1996); See generally Okediji, supra
note 71, at 116 (discussing the questions presented to the USA regarding Fair Use
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delegates defended Fair Use arguing that it embodied “essentially the
same goals as Article 13 of TRIPS”73 and is “applied and interpreted
in a way entirely congruent with the standards set forth in that
Article.”74 Ultimately, however, the European Community, Australia,
and New Zealand dropped the issue, and it never reached a tribunal
or court. Accordingly, the answer today still depends largely on how
one interprets the Three-Step Test. This interpretation remains hotly
contested.

B. TWO ANSWERS: THE “TRADITIONAL” AND “BALANCED”
INTERPRETATIONS
Two interpretations of the Three-Step Test exist: the so-called
“Traditional” and “Balanced” Interpretations. Those who adopt the
Traditional Interpretation typically find Fair Use fails to pass the
Three-Step Test; those who adopt the Balanced Interpretation reach
the opposite conclusion.
1. The Traditional Interpretation
According to the Traditional Interpretation, the purpose of the
Berne Convention Revision was to increase worldwide copyright
standards, and to ensure authors enjoy a high level of legal
protection. As stated in the preparatory documents created by The
United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual
Property (BIRPI), the purpose of the Stockholm Revision was “the
enlargement of the protection granted to authors by the creation of
new rights or by the extension of rights which are already
recognized.”75 The enlargement goal was executed by the
introduction of Article 9 and the right of reproduction. According to
BIRPI, “it was obvious that all forms of exploiting a work which
had, or were likely to acquire, considerable economic or practical
importance must in principle be reserved to the authors and
“exceptions that might restrict the possibilities open to authors in

and article 13 TRIPS).
73. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
supra note 72, at 4; Okediji, supra note 71, at 117.
74. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra
note 72, at 4.
75. WIPO Stockholm Records, supra note 69, at 80.
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these respects were unacceptable.”76 Subsequently, this highprotectionist goal has been criticized. Ruth Okediji, for example,
criticizes the progressive “ratcheting up” of copyright protections in
each round of Berne Revisions,77 and the developed nation desire to
ensure “near absolute control over reproduction of the protected
works.”78
Those who favor the so-called Traditional Interpretation do not
deny that exceptions and limitations play an important role in
international copyright law; however, given the overall purpose of
increasing worldwide copyright standards, supporters of this
interpretation take a conservative stance towards permissible
limitations. The BIRPI study, after deciding that exceptions are
generally unacceptable, stated that “it should not be forgotten that
domestic laws already contained a series of exceptions in favor of
various public and cultural interests and that it would be vain to
suppose that countries would be ready at this stage to abolish these
exceptions to any appreciable extent.”79 Rather than abolish such
exceptions, the Three-Step Test formula ensures that pre-existing
exceptions and limitations remained unscathed.80 But while the
Three-Step Test clearly permits Union members’ pre-existing
exceptions, the Three-Step Test views new exceptions suspiciously.
Scholars have occasionally argued that, consistent with the “strong
level of protection that the Berne Convention creates, the three
requirements of article 9(2) are cumulatively interpreted to yield the
most narrow effect”81 and that “[b]road exceptions are not
sanctioned.”82 To accomplish this, each “step” of the Three-Step Test
76. Id. at 111.
77. Okediji, supra note 71, at 105. See also Okediji, supra note 71, at 106 (“By
the time of the last substantive Berne Convention revision, the Stockholm
Conference of 1967, the scope of exceptions to authors’ rights had noticeably
contracted.”). Indeed the “fundamental design objective” of the Berne Convention
changed through revisions from a “pan-universal, minimalist treaty” to “one which
provided significant substantive provisions for the protection of copyright on a
multilateral basis,” Id. at 109. This trend was arguably even more noticeable in
TRIPS. Arguably one of the “cardinal objectives” of TRIPS was to “extend strong
intellectual property rules to the rest of the world” Id. at 81.
78. Id. at 107.
79. WIPO Stockholm Records, supra note 69, at 111-12.
80. Id.
81. Okediji, supra note 71, at 111.
82. Id.
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is construed as a necessary condition that a national copyright
limitation must successfully pass, and is to be interpreted narrowly.
The Traditional Interpretation came to prominence in the year
2000 when it was adopted and formulated in the WTO panel report
on §110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act.83 In this case, the E.C.
challenged a provision of the U.S. Copyright Act, which allowed
bars, stores, and restaurants to play broadcast radio and TV music to
patrons without the permission of the owners.84 The E.C. argued
that this provision was inconsistent with the Three-Step Test as
embodied in Article 13 of TRIPS, and argued that the “objective of
the TRIPS Agreement is to reduce or eliminate existing exceptions,
rather than to grant new or extend existing ones.” 85 But the panel
provided no conclusions regarding the purpose of the TRIPS
agreement. The Panel did agree that parties should interpret the three
steps “cumulatively” as independent, necessary conditions, and
interpreted each step in a manner that has subsequently been
described as narrow and restrictive.86 The Panel interpreted the
“certain special case” clause as requiring exceptions to be “clearly
defined” 87 (to “guarantee a sufficient degree of legal certainty”88)
and “narrow” in scope 89 (defined by the number of users to whom
the exception applies). Copying would conflict with a “normal
exploitation” of the work, if it potentially could enter into economic
competition with the ways the owner had traditionally extracted, or
with “a certain degree of likelihood and probability”90 could in the

83. See Panel Report, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,
31-34, WTO Doc. WT/DS160/R (adopted June 15, 2000) [hereinafter Section
110(5) Panel Report].
84. See id. at 2-3 (noting that the dispute concerned Section 110(5) of the
Copyright Act which limited exclusive ownership rights by allowing radio and
television broadcasts of copyrighted materials).
85. Id. at 28.
86. Id. at 27 (noting that new limitations or exceptions to copyright ownership
rights can only be made if they satisfy all three conditions of the Three-Step Test).
87. See id. at 33 (highlighting that while “certain, special cases” must be
clearly defined, this does not mean that each and every possible situation must be
explicitly named but that the scope of the exception is known and particularized).
88. Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 83, at 33.
89. See id. (arguing that the use of the word “special” means that any
exceptions or limitations must be narrow in application or exceptional in scope).
90. Id. at 48.
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future extract, “economic value”91 from the work. Finally, such
copying would “unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests” of
the owner if it had the “potential to cause an unreasonable loss of
income.”92 Section 1105(B), which enabled businesses under a
certain square footage to enjoy an exception, failed each of these
steps. In particular, the Panel did not consider Section 1105(B)
narrow in scope because 70 percent of all eating and drinking
establishments, and 45 percent of all retail establishments could
benefit from the exemption. Accordingly, it deprived copyright
owners of “a major potential source of revenue.”93 The cumulative
requirements of clear definition, narrowness in scope, and the
absence of negative market effect now or sometime in the future
formed a high burden that the “business exemption” could not
overcome.
A number of scholars have applied the “Traditional Interpretation”
of the Three-Step Test to the question of Fair Use and concluded that
the doctrine fails to pass the test. Writing in 2000, Okediji found a
number of challenges to Fair Use under the WTO panel’s
reasoning.94 First, the requirement that the limitation be well-defined,
and thus provide a sufficient degree of legal certainty, is problematic
because the “only certainty involved in construing fair use is
uncertainty in how a court will ultimately rule.”95 As a vague,
flexible standard the Fair Use concept is one of the least predictable
in U.S. law and one of the least predictable exceptions in global
copyright.96 Second, the Fair Use doctrine may not be a “special
91. Id.
92. Id. at 59.
93. Id. at 54-55.
94. See Okediji, supra note 71, at 117 (finding there are “at least three potential
arguments to support the supposition that the fair use doctrine violates Article 9(2)
of the Berne Convention and, de facto, Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement”); those
arguments are the indeterminacy of fair use, the breadth of fair use, and fair use’s
potential nullification and impairment of expected benefits. Okediji does note,
however, that it is unlikely that these arguments would ever result in an
international challenge to the doctrine. The overall conclusion is that, under the
more Traditionalist interpretation, the “status of the fair use doctrine under
international law is, at best, uncertain despite averments to the contrary by the
United States.” Id. at 87.
95. Id. at 118.
96. Some scholars have previously criticized the Fair Use doctrine for such
lack of predictability, see e.g. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG
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case” in terms of the overall number of copiers it exempts.97 The Fair
Use doctrine is broad and exempts a highly heterogeneous set of
copying, and, unlike other U.S. copyright limits, “is unlimited in the
scope of users because it is a defense potentially available to every
defendant in a claim for copyright infringement.”98 Finally, in some
cases, copying that causes economic competition with the copyright
owner may still be considered “fair.”99 While negative market effect
is a strong factor against a finding of fair use, it is not conclusive
proof of unfairness, and may be outweighed by countervailing
considerations.
The fact that the Fair Use doctrine appears to fail the Three-Step
Test under the “Traditional” Interpretation begs the question: Why
was the U.S. allowed to join the Berne Union without amending
§107 of the Copyright Act? Okediji suggests one possibility: that
other Union members were “willing to accept less than full
compliance in exchange for the increased importance that U.S.
accession would bring to the Berne Convention.”100 Nevertheless,
despite her conclusion that, as a descriptive matter, Fair Use arguably
fails the Three-Step Test as interpreted by the WTO panel, Okediji
supports the Fair Use doctrine normatively.101 Unlike others
analyzing the issue from the Traditional Interpretation, Okediji finds
the Fair Use doctrine beneficial to the public interest and accordingly
advocates that international copyright norms ought to be altered to
permit the limitation.102
MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL
CREATIVITY 187 (2004) (noting that Fair Use is so unpredictable that it is only the
“right to hire a lawyer”). Other scholars have noticeably reacted against such views
and pointed out that Fair Use is more predictable than some have previously
suggested, see Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use
Opinions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense
of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715 (2011); Matthew Sag, Predicting
Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012); Samuelson, supra note 51. However, while
clearly outcomes are to an extent predictable, Fair Use is nevertheless the one of
the most unpredictable doctrines known to US domestic, or international copyright,
law.
97. See Okediji, supra note 71, at 119.
98. Id. at 128.
99. Id. at 130.
100. Id. at 114-15.
101. See id. at 151-72 (providing an argument that international copyright law
should adopt a form of “international fair use doctrine”).
102. Id.
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2. The Balanced Interpretation
Reacting in part to the WTO panel report, some scholars propose
an alternative “Balanced Interpretation” of the Three-Step Test. Two
primary sources of this interpretation are Martin Senftleben’s
monograph, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS, AND THE THREE-STEP TEST,103
and the DECLARATION ON THE BALANCED INTERPRETATION OF THE
“THREE-STEP TEST” IN COPYRIGHT LAW (the Munich Declaration),104
prepared by the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and
Queen Mary’s School of Law, and later signed by 50 intellectual
property researchers. This interpretation confirms the legitimacy of
Fair Use.105
According to the Balanced Interpretation, the purpose of the Berne
Convention, TRIPS, and other international copyright treaties is not
merely to increase worldwide copyright protection, but to ensure an
effective and appropriate “balance of interests” between copyright
owners and others in society.106 Senftleben’s monograph, and the
Munich Declaration diverge slightly regarding what normative
values are to be used in measuring the appropriateness of the
balance. Senftleben adopts a deontological normative baseline of
“intergenerational equality” in which authors are naturally entitled to
own their creative works so long as ownership leaves “enough and as
good” in common” for later authors to create.107 The Munich
Declaration, in contrast, suggests that copyright’s purpose is to
“benefit the public interest” and hints that an appropriate balance is
one that maximizes the interests or preferences of all members of

103. MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS, AND THE THREE-STEP
TEST (Kluwer 2004) [hereinafter Senftleben].
104. Christophe Geiger, Jonathan Griffiths & Reto Hilty, Towards a Balanced
Interpretation of the “Three-Step Test” in Copyright Law, 30 E.I.P.R. 489 (2008)
[Hereinafter “Munich Declaration”].
105. Other less restrictive interpretations of the Three-Step Test can be found in,
e.g. Daniel J. Gervais, Towards a New Core International Copyright Norm: The
Reverse Three-Step Test, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 28 (2005) (arguing for
a reverse three-step approach focusing on the effect on the rights holder).
106. Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 492.
107. SENFTLEBEN, supra note 103, at 34-42. In effect, Senftleben adopts a
Lockean normative theory of copyright. See generally, Wendy Gordon, A Property
Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1533 (1993).
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society.108 Both sources agree that the Traditional Interpretation does
not achieve the “appropriate balance” of interests.109 The Traditional
Interpretation prevents states from enacting limitations that
fundamentally undermine incentives to create new works.
Unfortunately, the restrictive Traditional Interpretation prevents
states from enacting some limitations, such as Fair Use, to ensure an
appropriate balance of interests, especially in the current information
age.110 This new theory therefore “proposes an appropriately
balanced interpretation of the Three-Step Test under which existing
exceptions and limitations within domestic law are not unduly
restricted and the introduction of appropriately balanced exceptions
and limitations is not precluded.” 111
The “appropriately balanced” interpretation differs from the
Traditional Interpretation in two ways. First, the three steps are not
read as cumulative or necessary conditions but rather require a
“comprehensive overall assessment.”112 When assessing whether a
limitation passes the Three-Step Test, the decision maker must first
assess how the limitation fairs under each individual step, and then
weigh the conclusions reached under each step against one another in
a final analysis. This allows the decision maker to hold that if the
limitation passes two of the steps but fails one then, on balance, it
should potentially be allowed to pass the Three-Step Test’s overall
108. Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 493.
109. See SENFTLEBEN, supra note 103, at 81-82 (noting the dualist character of
the Three-Step Test; designed both to preserve limitations existing at the time of
the 1967 Stockholm Conference as well as to preserve the author’s right to control
reproduction of the copyrighted work); Munich Declaration, supra note 119, at 492
(stating “[t]he Three-Step Test has already established an effective means of
preventing the excessive application of limitations and exceptions . . . [h]owever,
there is no complementary mechanism prohibiting an unduly narrow or restrictive
approach.”).
110. See Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 490-91 (arguing that the
restrictive nature of the traditional approach may hinder policy-makers in
responding to technological change and make it more difficult to respond to the
interests of economic competition and creators and performers who might use the
work).
111. Id. at 494.
112. Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 495 (highlighting that the three
steps are to be considered together and as a whole). See also Christophe Geiger et
al, The Three Step Test Revisited: How to Use the Test’s Flexibility in National
Copyright Law, 29 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 581, 585 (2014) (defending a view that
the three steps are not separate although they should be considered sequentially).
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assessment.113 Second, the Balanced Interpretation differs in its
interpretation of each individual step. The Balanced Interpretation
disagrees that “certain special cases” require a limitation that should
call for both a clear definition and a narrow scope. The Munich
Declaration interprets the first step as simply requiring that the
application of the limitation be “reasonably foreseeable.”114
Senftleben’s analysis adds some more complexity. In Senftleben’s
interpretation, the “certainty” term only requires that the limitation
clearly indicate “some” uses that are privileged,115 and the
“specialness” requirement is fulfilled if the limitation fulfills some
“clear reason of public policy” and thus “rests on a rational
justificatory basis.”116 The Balanced Interpretation also disagrees
that any actual or potential economic competition in a current or
reasonably plausible future market conflicts with a normal
exploitation.117 Rather the Balanced Interpretation finds that defining
“normal” expectation must take into account competing
considerations such as the beneficial effect of competition.118
Similarly, when defining what qualifies as unreasonable prejudice to
the author’s legitimate interests, the analysis must account for the
human and fundamental rights of others, as well as the public interest
in social and scientific progress.119 The divergences between the
Traditional and Balanced Interpretations are summarized in Table 1.

113. See Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 495 (stating that the three steps
are an “indivisible entirety” to be taken together during assessment of whether a
limitation passes or fails the tests).
114. Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 495.
115. SENFTLEBEN, supra note 103, at 133-37.
116. Id. at 137-38.
117. Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 490.
118. Id. at 495 (stating that limitations and exceptions do not conflict with a
normal exploitation of protected subject matter if they “are based on important
competing considerations”).
119. Id. (declaring that the Three-Step Test should be interpreted in a manner
respecting the legitimate interest of third parties including “interests deriving from
human rights and fundamental freedoms” and “other public interests, notably in
scientific progress and cultural, social, or economic development”).
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF TRADITIONAL AND BALANCED INTERPRETATIONS

Purpose

Traditional

Balanced

Interpretation

Interpretation

Ensure High Level of

Appropriate Balance

Author Rights

of Interests

Protection
Interrelationship

Cumulative

Comprehensive

of Steps

Conditions

Overall Assessment

1. Certain Special

Clear Definition +

Reasonable

Cases

Narrow Scope

Foreseeability OR
Some uses privileged
for policy reasons

2. Normal

Actual or Potential,

Unreasonable

Exploitation

Present or Future,

Economic

Economic

Competition

Competition
3. Unreasonable

Unreasonable Loss of Unreasonable Loss of

Prejudice to

Income

Income, taking into

Legitimate

account Third Party

Interest

Interests
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The Fair Use doctrine passes the Balanced Interpretation of the
Three-Step Test. The Declaration finds that the certain special case
requirement does not prevent legislatures from introducing “open
ended limitations” so long as their scope is reasonably foreseeable.
120
The Declaration states this is of “particular importance in the
common law world, in which “fair use” and “fair dealing” provisions
have traditionally functioned as mechanisms of balancing the
interests” of owners and users, suggesting the U.S. Fair Use doctrine
passes the reasonable foreseeability test.121 Senftleben concurs that
the U.S. style Fair Use doctrine is limited to certain special cases.122
Not only legislatures, but also courts can indicate which uses fall
within the exception. The U.S. Fair Use doctrine is sufficiently
certain, therefore, because over time courts have identified a clear
group of uses that are privileged.123 Furthermore, regarding the
“special case” requirement, Senftleben concludes that, because the
Fair Use doctrine has some underlying policy rationale, it “appears
not unreasonable to assume that on balance, the fair use doctrine
meets this qualitative standard.”124 Finally, the argument for Fair
Use’s legitimacy is strengthened by the Balanced Interpretation’s
claim that a limitation need not pass every step in order to pass the
Three-Step Test overall.125 The Fair Use doctrine is a necessary
doctrinal tool that enables countries to define what qualifies as a
“normal exploitation” of the work, as well as what the “legitimate
interests of authors” are, in a world where technological change
prevents legislatures from setting precise copyright rules far in
advance. Therefore, to the extent the doctrine fails the first step, it
may still pass muster under the Three-Step Test overall.
Subsequently, a number of countries have relied on the Balanced
Interpretation to justify their decision to adopt, or propose the
adoption of, a Fair Use doctrine. The Australian Law Reform

120. Id.
121. Id. at 491.
122. SENFTLEBEN, supra note 103, at 112.
123. Id. at 166 (using U.S. fair use doctrine towards “criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research”).
124. Id. at 167.
125. See Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 491 (describing the test as
functioning “as an indivisible entity and that, accordingly, one particular ‘step’
cannot function as a ‘showstopper’”).
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Commission126 and the Irish Copyright Commission127 both cite to
the Declaration and Senftleben’s monograph to support their
conclusion that Fair Use complies with the Three-Step Test. The
new approach also has considerable impact in copyright reform
debates of other countries, such as the UK.128

C. THE CRITIQUE OF THE BALANCED INTERPRETATION
Advocates of the WTO approach have subsequently criticized the
Balanced Interpretation. Supporters of the Traditional Interpretation
argue the Balanced Interpretation is not an interpretation at all, but a
reform proposal in disguise. Former WIPO Assistant Director
General Mihály Ficsor argues that “[w]hat [the Declaration drafters]
truly aimed for is not just “correcting” the above-outlined
consistently followed “traditional” interpretation but rather changing
the relevant international norms under the guise of a new
interpretation.”129 Likewise, André Lucas accuses the Declaration
drafters of concocting an interpretation of the Three-Step Test that is
not based on treaty language or history, but rather on the “desire to
legitimize” the U.S. Fair Use Doctrine. 130 This critique can be
broken down into two parts.
First, critics argue that the Traditional Interpretation is more
consistent with the relevant legal sources.131 The Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”) requires that treaty parties interpret
provisions in “accordance with the ordinary meaning,” taking into
account relevant context and the treaty’s object and purpose. 132
Arguably the purpose behind the Stockholm Revision Conference
126. Copyright and the Digital Economy, ALRC Report 122, para 4.147.
127. COPYRIGHT REVIEW COMM., DEP’T OF JOBS, ENTER., & INNOVATION.,
COPYRIGHT AND INNOVATION: A CONSULTATION PAPER 123 (2012).
128. Supra note 11.
129. Mihály J. Ficsor, “Munich Declaration” on the Three-Step Test Respectable Objective; Wrong Way to Try to Achieve It 13 (May 11, 2012)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://www.copyrightseesaw.net/archive/?sw_10_item=15.
130. André Lucas, For a Reasonable Interpretation of the Three-Step Test, 32
EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 277, 279 (2010).
131. See Ficsor, supra note 129, at 15 (arguing that the Three-Step Test does not
have appropriate legal foundation).
132. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340.
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was to ensure copyright owners a strong level of protection. As the
BIRPI preparatory study suggested, the goal was to ensure that “all
forms of exploiting a work” with potential economic significance
ought to be reserved to the authors, while exceptions to that principle
were “unacceptable.”133 The “ordinary meaning” of the Three-Step
Test’s wording seems consistent with that protectionist goal. By
requiring that exceptions be limited to “certain special cases,
provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work, and does not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the author,” the Three-Step Test created a
number of necessary, cumulative conditions that a limitation must
satisfy in order to be legitimate. Moreover, the few cases in which
the Test has been interpreted, the most important being the WTO
panel report, follow the restrictive interpretation.134
Second, critics argue that the Balanced Interpretation is not really
a description of the Three-Step Test’s requirements at all, but rather
is a thinly veiled argument about what the law ought to be. And
certainly, this seems a plausible interpretation of the argument, given
the type of rhetoric and evidence used to defend the Balanced
Interpretation. The drafters of the Balanced Interpretation support
their interpretation, in large part, by appealing to normative value.
The central contention is that the new interpretation is more
“appropriately balanced” and, ergo, is a more accurate description of
what the Three-Step Test really requires.135 The “appropriateness” of
the values is appraised in the light of intergenerational equality
(Senftleben) or the maximization of society’s aggregate interests
(Declaration).136 From this perspective, the Traditional Interpretation
is “undesirable” 137 and “unduly” 138 narrows the scope of limitations
133. Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 83, at 28.
134. E.g., Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 83, at 31 (requiring the three
conditions to “apply on a cumulative basis”).
135. Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 494 (noting the Declaration’s
proposal for an “appropriately balanced interpretation of the Three-Step Test”
under which exceptions and limitations “are not unduly restricted”).
136. SENFTLEBEN, supra note 103, at 92-93 (arguing that the use of modern
technology for reproduction of works should “not be hindered and its adverse
effects on the interests of authors and beneficiaries of neighboring rights should be
mitigated by appropriate means of protection”).
137. Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 494 (describing “certain
interpretations of the Three-Step Test at international level to be undesirable”).
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that states may enact.139 The Balanced Interpretation then proceeds
from this normative value to propose what sound like changes to the
dominant Traditional Interpretation. The Declaration concludes the
Test “should be interpreted”140 less restrictively in the future and, to
that end, “proposes an appropriately balanced interpretation of the
Tree-Step Test.”141 The overt normative judgment, coupled with the
prescriptive solution, certainly make it sound like the Balanced
Interpretation is a proposal for changing existing obligations.

III. THE INTERPRETIVE ARGUMENT FOR THE
BALANCED INTERPRETATION
Can the Balanced Interpretation’s doctrinal claim be defended in
light of the traditionalist criticism? Note, the question is not which
interpretation is simply the most normatively attractive142 nor
whether the Balanced Interpretation is one of many legitimate
interpretations, but rather whether, in the light of the traditionalists’
arguments, the Balanced Interpretation could nevertheless be seen as
the correct interpretation of the Three-Step Test? This Part argues
that the doctrinal claim could be defended, but to do so requires
supporters of the interpretation to adopt some version of, what this
Essay calls, the “Interpretive Argument.” In a nutshell, this argument
proclaims the Balanced Interpretation the correct legal interpretation
because it presents the Three-Step Test in its “best light.” Section A
discusses approaches to international treaty interpretation. Section B
then develops the Interpretive Argument.

A. INTERPRETING THE THREE-STEP TEST
Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT create a specific hierarchy of
considerations to be taken into account when interpreting treaty
138. Id. at 491.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 492 (arguing that the Three-Step Test “should be interpreted so as to
ensure a proper and balanced application of limitations and exceptions”).
141. Id.
142. In this author’s opinion the Balanced Interpretation is a clearly more
normatively attractive vision for the Three-Step Test. If the Berne Convention
were to be rewritten, I would prefer to see this version of the Test incorporated.
But the question for now is more legalistic: can it be plausibly claimed that the
Balanced Interpretation is already an accurate understanding of state obligations
under the Test?
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provisions.143 Nevertheless, despite this hierarchy, legal writers have
historically emphasized competing considerations in the interpretive
process. Very broadly, three schools of treaty interpretation exist:
textualist, intentionalist, and teleological.144 This Section argues that
it is difficult to support the formal-doctrinal claims of the Balanced
Interpretation on the grounds of textualism or intentionalism, but that
there may be greater support from teleological approaches.
Textualist approaches emphasize the words of the treaty
provision.145 This commitment to textualism is found in article 31
VCLT, which requires that treaty provisions be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the “ordinary meaning” of the terms. The
approach, is sometimes seen as epitomized in the famous statement
of Vattell: “the first general maxim of interpretation is that it is not
permissible to interpret what does not need interpretation.”146 When
the ordinary meaning of the provision is clear, there is little need to
search further.
However, textualism provides little support for the doctrinal
claims of the Balanced Interpretation. In some cases, the “ordinary
meaning” of the Three-Step Test is hostile to the Balanced
Interpretation. In particular, the text’s ordinary meaning fits
uncomfortably with the claim that the three steps should be read as a
“comprehensive overall assessment.”147 The provision permits
copying in “certain special cases, provided that such reproduction
does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.”148 On
the basis of “ordinary meaning” it is difficult to view the steps as
anything other than necessary and cumulative conditions. In other
143. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31 & art.32, opened for
signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340.
144. Francis G. Jacobs, Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: With
Special Reference to the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties before the
Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 18 INT. & COMP. L. Q. 318, 318-320 (1969); IAN
SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 69-76 (1973).
145. Jacobs, supra note 144, at 322-323.
146. VATTEL, LE DRIOT DES GENS OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE para
263 (1758) (“la premiere maxime generale sur l’interpretation est, qu’il n’est pas
permis d’intepreter ce qui n’a pas besoin d’interpretation”).
147. Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 495.
148. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supra
note 13, art. 9.
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cases, the text is not hostile to the Balanced Interpretation, but is too
vague and ambiguous to support the formalist claims made on its
behalf. For example, the term “certain special cases” is capable of
multiple “ordinary meanings.” The “certain special case”
requirement could be read either as a requirement that all limitations
be clearly defined and narrow in scope, or more modestly, that
limitations be confined to some “reasonably foreseeable” instances,
and in neither case would we contravene any conventional use of
language.149 In such cases, the Balanced Interpretation’s meaning is
certainly not ruled out or precluded, but there is not the conclusive
support required to proclaim it the sole correct interpretation, and the
Traditional interpretation invalid. To support this bolder claim, one
must go beyond the text’s ordinary meaning.
The second well-known approach is intentionalism.150 This school
emphasizes the actual intentions of the parties. If states are only
bound by international obligations based on their consent, then it
would follow that, in order to understand the extent of a state’s
obligations, one must try to find out what rules the state intended to
follow. Jurists in this school argue that the travaux préparatoires and
negotiating history frequently must be consulted to gain insight into
the will of the contracting states. However, this approach has
historically adopted a secondary role in international treaty
interpretation – as evidenced by the fact that the VCLT allows
recourse to “supplemental means of interpretation” only when the
interpretation would otherwise be ambiguous, obscure, absurd or
unreasonable.151 This reflects concerns over some of the theoretical
problems associated with divining the intent of the parties.152
Frequently there will be no common intention amongst parties, but
instead states will each have their own intentions in joining the
treaty; what intent should govern in such cases? Furthermore, even in
the case where there is a meeting of the minds, frequently the states
will not anticipate future developments, making it necessary for
jurists to try to extrapolate state intent to the new situation.
Intentionalism does not provide the level of support required to
149.
150.
151.
152.

Senftleben, The International Three-Step Test, supra note 103, at 78.
Jacobs, supra note 144, at 320-22.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32 (1969).
Jacobs, supra note 144, at 338-39.
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support the Balanced Interpretation as a formal-doctrinal matter. As
an initial matter, there is some reason to believe that the parties
“intended” the Three-Step Test as a restrictive provision, as
evidenced by the high-protectionist rhetoric surrounding the Test’s
introduction. As noted earlier, the BIRPI study proclaimed the reason
for the Berne revision was the “enlargement of the protection granted
to authors by the creation of new rights or by the extension of rights
which are already recognized,”153 and that the “it was obvious that all
forms of exploiting a work which had, or were likely to acquire,
considerable economic or practical importance must in principle be
reserved to the authors.”154 On the question of exceptions, BIPRI
concluded that “exceptions that might restrict the possibilities open
to authors in these respects were unacceptable.”155 Begrudgingly, the
study group admitted that national legislation already contained
many exceptions and that “it would be vain to suppose that States
would be ready at this stage to do away with this exceptions to any
appreciable extent,”156 leaving open the possibility that this
questionable ideal could be obtained in the future.157
But even more importantly, it seems unlikely that there was a
common intent regarding the meaning of the Test’s wording. As
Martin Senftleben points out, there is a “dualism” inherent in the
Three-Step Test.158 When the Test was drafted, states adopted a
highly heterodox array of exceptions. The Three-Step Test was not,
as acknowledged by BIRPI, intended to hack away at these national
153. Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 83, at 2-3.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 28.
156. Id. at 33.
157. Arguably the parties also intended the steps of the Three-Step Test to be
necessary cumulative conditions. See WIPO Stockholm Records, supra note 69, at
1145-6:
The Committee also adopted a proposal by the Drafting Committee that the second
condition should be placed before the first, as this would afford a more logical order
for the interpretation of the rule. If it is considered that reproduction conflicts with the
normal exploitation of the work, reproduction is not permitted at all. If it is considered
that reproduction does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work, the next
step would be to consider whether it does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the author. Only if such is not the case would it be possible in certain
special cases to introduce a compulsory license, or to provide for use without payment.

But see Geiger et al, supra 112 (arguing the steps are sequential without
necessarily being separate).
158. SENFTLEBEN, supra note 103, at 81-82.
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approaches to copyright scope. The task of the Conference was
therefore to find a linguistic formula that would have some “bite”
and prevent excessive limitations to the reproduction right, while
permitting a broad array of traditional national exceptions. Early in
the drafting process, the parties attempted to define some specific
permissible exceptions. But the parties could not agree what specific
uses ought to be exempted. Illustrative is the issue of “private use.”
Initially “private use” was included as a specifically exempted use,
but was removed due to party disagreement: Italy preferred a
“personal use” exemption, while France opted for an “individual or
family use” formulation.159 After such debates, the UK proposed
simply to adopt a general, abstract formula, rather than try to
enumerate specific exceptions. This abstract formula was ultimately
adopted.160 But in so doing, the parties stripped away much of the
provision’s meaning. The new provision was sufficiently light on
substance that it could plausibly cover the great array of different
national exceptions that existed, and was so lacking in meaning that
it could not be seriously objectionable to any states’ national
interests. If history demonstrates anything here, it is that the parties
intended an ambiguous and vague provision with little concrete rules.
It is accordingly difficult to divine more precise meaning for the
Test’s provisions from party intentions. If meaning is to be found, it
would need to come from somewhere other than the parties’
intentions.
The final school is the teleological school.161 In the words of
article 31 VCLT the treaty wording should be interpreted in the
“light of its object and purpose.”162 Thus ambiguous treaty language
is to be interpreted in a way that furthers the fundamental reason or
problem the treaty is meant to address. To a certain extent, this
inquiry overlaps with the first two schools: the ordinary meaning and
party intentions often clearly highlight the object and purpose of a
treaty. However, this is not necessarily the case.163 For some treaties,
particularly more “organic” or “constitutional” treaties such as the
UN Charter, the object and purpose may be construed in the light of
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 50-51.
Id.
Jacobs, supra note 144, at 323-25.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31 (1969).
Jacobs, supra note 144, at 319-20.
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subsequent developments. Some scholars, such as Fitzmaurice, have
claimed that according to a doctrine of “emergent purpose,” the
objects and purposes of a treaty are not “fixed and static” but “liable
to change” over time.164 The purpose used to guide the interpretation
are those which the interpreter views the treaty as achieving at time
of interpretation, and not necessarily those which existed at the time
of the treaty’s conclusion. Some have, however, noted this is an
“extreme” teleological approach.165
Adopting a teleological lens would undoubtedly provide the
greatest support for the Balanced Interpretation as a doctrinal matter.
Not only are there problems with the competing approaches of
textualism and intentionalism, but the authors of the Balanced
Interpretation appeal very heavily to the concepts of “appropriate
balance” and public interest to justify their conclusions.166 However,
adopting a teleological lens is itself not free from problems. Firstly,
there is the question of how do we construe the object and purposes
of the Three-Step Test when those objects and purposes are
contested? For example, while an appropriate balance of rights and
obligations to maximize social interests is the purpose favored by the
Declaration, not too long ago, in the WTO, the European
Community argued that, at least in TRIPS, the Three Step Test’s
objective was to “reduce or eliminate existing exceptions, rather than
to grant new or extend existing ones.”167 Even if we grant that objects
and purposes may change over time, which conception of objects and
purposes ought to guide interpretation today? Secondly, what is to be
done in cases where furthering the objects and purposes attributed to
a treaty today conflicts with other considerations such as the ordinary
meaning of the provisions wording, or prior judicial interpretations?
In order to answer these questions, one needs a more fully fleshedout theory of teleological interpretation.
The strongest support for the Balanced Interpretation arguably
comes from a teleological approach commonly adopted at the
164. Id. at 320.
165. G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of
Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and Certain other Treaty Points, 33 B.Y.I.L.
208 (1957).
166. See e.g. ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, THE INTERPRETATION OF ACTS
AND RULES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 343 (2008).
167. Supra note 85.
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domestic level: Legal Interpretivism as developed primarily be
Ronald Dworkin.168 Strictly speaking, Legal Interpretivism is not a
theory of interpretation, but a jurisprudential theory on the nature of
law. Its chief foil is Legal Positivism, particularly as defended by
HLA Hart.169 Legal Positivism is commonly associated with two
theses: the social fact thesis and the separability thesis.170 Briefly, the
first thesis holds that law is a social fact, not a moral fact. That is,
law is something created by people, not by God, reason, or abstract
morality. The separability thesis holds that what the law is and what
the law ought to be are distinct questions. While Positivists disagree
internally about the connection of law and morality, at the very least
they agree that in order for a social rule to be “law” it need not
necessarily align with morality. This stands in contrast to the Natural
Law tradition which views law, at least partly, as flowing from
morality, and that social rules in contravention of morality were not
“law” properly so called (summed up in the Aquinas phrase of lex
injustia est not lex). Legal Interpretivism is commonly seen as being
a third jurisprudential school occupying a space between Positivism
and Natural Law. In contrast to Positivists, Interpretivists claim that
“law” is not so much a noun, but a verb. That is, law is not a set of
socially constructed rules, but is an act of interpretation.171
Understanding what the law on a given issue involves more than a
search for a set of historical legal materials, but requires the
interpretation of such materials today in light of contemporary
values.
Given Legal Interpretivism views interpretation as the very
“nature” of law, it has a particularly robust conception of how legal
interpretation works. To Dworkin, legal interpretation is not merely a
historical search for certain social facts (e.g. legislation, case
decisions), but is a partly moral exercise. In contrast to Positivism,
moral values, even when not explicitly incorporated into legal
materials, are relevant to legal interpretation. In particular, when
trying to interpret a source of law (whether that be a case holding, or
168. Dworkin, supra note 26, at 45-87 (1986).
169. HLA HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79-99 (2012, 3d ed).
170. Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138,
1140-1144 (1999).
171. And as such, has some connection or overlap with the Legal Process school
of jurisprudence. See id. at 1155-1158.
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a statutory section etc.), one must take into account the purpose that
the area of law is meant to serve. Like Fitzmaurice in the
international arena, “purpose” is understood dynamically by
Dworkin. Rather than being fixed in time, purpose is, to an extent,
imposed on legal materials.172 The goal of legal interpretation is to
find the most normatively desirable purpose that an area of law could
fulfil, and interpret the sources in light of that objective. Thus, legal
interpretation is a “constructive” or “creative” process.173 The
creative nature of interpretation, however, does not enable the
interpreter to interpret a legal rule in whatever way most pleases
her.174 The interpretation must be an interpretation, rather than
complete reinvention, of a social practice. The goal of constructive
interpretation is to find an interpretation which “fits” the existing
material while simultaneously furthering the most morally attractive
purposes “justifying” the law.175 The goal is thus to find the
interpretation which shows the law in its “best light,” or which proactively makes the law the best it possibly can be, given the
constraints of history.176
In turn, this theory offers an account of legal interpretation which
is robust enough to answer the two questions posed earlier to
teleological approaches. The purpose which should govern an
interpretation is the most normatively attractive justification.
Furthermore, certain sources of law (an outlying case for example)
can be proclaimed as erroneous to the extent they conflict with the
overall best constructive interpretation. Indeed, these commitments
enabled Dworkin to defend a formalist theory of adjudication: there
was, in practically all cases, a best constructive interpretation which
172. See Dworkin, supra note 26, at 52 (“Roughly, constructive interpretation is
a matter of imposing purpose on an object or practice in order to make of it the best
possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong.”)
173. Id.
174. Id. (“It does not follow, even from that rough account, that an interpreter
can make of a practice or work of art anything he would have wanted it to be . . .
For the history or shape of a practice or object constrains the available
interpretations of it . . . “).
175. Id. at 285 (“A successful interpretation must not only fit but also justify the
practice it interprets”).
176. Id. at 90 (stating that theories of law “try to show legal practice as a whole
in its best light, to achieve equilibrium between legal practice as they find it and
the best justification of that practice.”).
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a court could use to decide a controversy, and thus “right” answers in
hard cases.177

B. THE “INTERPRETIVE ARGUMENT” FOR BALANCE
While textualism and intentionalism provide little conclusive
support for the doctrinal claims of the Balanced Interpretation, a
particularly strong teleological approach, such as that encapsulated
by Legal Interpretivism, would arguably justify such claims. The
Balanced Interpretation is far more capable of presenting the Test in
its “best light” and thus serves as a better constructive interpretation
than the Traditional Interpretation. This Section therefore sketches
the type of Interpretive Argument that could be made in favor of the
Balanced Interpretation before using the argument to respond to
some of the traditionalist criticisms.
1. Fit
A successful constructive interpretation must broadly “fit” the
existing legal sources. Our interpretation of the Three-Step Test
must be largely consistent with the Test’s wording, its context, and
its purpose, as required by the VCLT.178 However, a constructive
interpretation “need not fit every aspect” of the wording and
history.179 To Interpretivists, the “fit” criterion is a “threshold”
requirement.180 The interpretation must, in other words, “fit enough
[of the historical legal sources] for the interpreter to be able to see
himself as interpreting that practice, not inventing a new one.”181
Accordingly, an interpretation may be inconsistent with some of the
Three-Step Test’s wording and history and yet still be, overall, the
right interpretation. The aim is not to create an interpretation that
exhibits perfect “vertical consistency” with a chain of historical
decisions, but an interpretation which is “horizontally consistent”
with the Test’s history, and the most normatively attractive purpose

177. For the infamous defense of this view, see Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975).
178. Vienna Convention, supra note 143, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340.
179. DWORKIN, supra note 26, at 66.
180. Id. at 255 (stating that “[c]onvictions about fit will provide a rough
threshold requirement”).
181. Id. at 66.
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the Test serves today.182
The Balanced Interpretation, largely, passes the “threshold” of
fit.183 In particular, the alternative meanings ascribed to each step are
not foreclosed. The requirement that limitations be confined to
“certain special cases” may, for example, mean the limitation be
clearly defined and narrow in scope. However, most English
speakers would agree that it may equally be a requirement of
“reasonable foreseeability” or that limitations identify “some”
special cases where the specialness of the case is defined
teleologically. Furthermore, the more permissive interpretation of
each step fits with the context of the Stockholm Revision and the
desire amongst delegates not to enact a provision which would divest
states of their traditional approaches to tailoring copyright scope.184
Certainly, the meanings ascribed by the Balanced Interpretation are
not consistent with all the relevant legal sources. The interpretation
of “certain special cases” as a reasonable foreseeability requirement
is arguably inconsistent with the WTO Copyright Case and its
decision that the first step be interpreted as requiring a narrow scope
as well as reasonable certainty.185 Nevertheless, this aspect of the
Balanced Interpretation clearly does enough to pass the threshold of
“fit.” It fits with enough of the legal sources (especially the ordinary
meaning of the words and the context) for a future adjudicator to
consider it a good faith interpretation of the Three-Step Test, rather
than the pure invention of new norms.
More difficult is the Balanced Interpretation’s claim that the three
steps can be interpreted as a “comprehensive overall assessment” and
not as three necessary and cumulative conditions.186 It is difficult to
see how this particular aspect of the new theory “fits” with the
historical legal sources. This aspect of the interpretation is difficult
to reconcile with the ordinary meaning of the language, which states
that limits are lawful in “certain special cases, provided that such
reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the
182. Id. at 277.
183. See supra Part II.B.1 (explaining that the interpretation need only fit
enough of a source for the interpreter to not invent a new practice); see also
Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 494.
184. See SENFTLEBEN, supra note 103 at 91-92.
185. Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 83, at 11.
186. Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 493.
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work, and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of
the author.”187 This aspect of the interpretation perhaps fails to meet
the threshold of fit.188
2. Justification
The next question is which interpretation best “justifies” the Three
Step Test? Which interpretation of the Test is consistent with the
most normatively attractive justification for international copyright
regulation? The answer is: the Balanced Interpretation.
The Traditional Interpretation views the purpose of international
copyright law as increasing worldwide copyright standards to the
highest feasible level and the Three-Step Test as safeguarding that
strong copyright protection.189 This is undeniably the purpose that
many international copyright lawyers intended modern international
copyright law to serve .190 However, to Interpretivists, the right
interpretation is not necessarily that which is consistent with the
historically intended purposes for international copyright law, but
rather that which furthers the most normatively defensible ones.191
This traditionalist justification for international copyright
regulation is not normatively attractive. If international copyright
law tries to achieve the highest feasible level of protection, bad
consequences will likely follow. Copyright protection benefits some
individuals in society. The Copyright owners are enabled to charge a
fee from those who would use the work, which not only is in their
interest but also in the interest of consumers who enjoy the new
works that are created as a result. However, copyright protection
also negatively affects the interests of others. Those who wish to use
the work in the future are required to pay higher fees for doing so,
187. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art.
9(2).
188. See Ficsor, supra note 129 at 15 (noting that what the Declaration suggests
is not just a new interpretation but rather a proposal for an amendment of the
treaties concerned).
189. Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 83, ¶ 6.78 (noting that “a principle
should be respected according to which the objective of the TRIPS Agreement is to
reduce or eliminate existing exceptions, rather than to grant new or extend existing
ones”).
190. Okediji, supra note 71, at 109.
191. See supra Part III.A.
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thus preventing socially valuable uses (e.g., parody, news reporting,
research etc.), and discouraging follow-on creators from creating
new works in the future.192 Assuming that all interests are of equal
importance, copyright protection ought to ensure the maximization
of these different interests. Unilaterally increasing copyright
standards without taking into account these other interests will likely
lead to a sub-optimal situation where society’s aggregate interests are
negatively affected.193
Appealing to natural rights cannot justify such a copyrightmaximum stance. On some accounts, authors are naturally entitled
to control the use of their works.194 Others in society, however,
equally enjoy natural rights.195 Those who build on prior works are
as much authors who deserve the products of their creative labor, and
who ought to have the autonomy to engage in culture as prior
generations’ creators.196 Even from a natural rights perspective, there
must be some way of reconciling the natural rights of authors, and
the equally important rights of others in society.197 Whatever way
one looks at the problem, therefore, the idea that international
copyright law must provide the highest level of protection to owners
without considering the desires of others in society is not defensible.
The Balanced Interpretation presents a far more normatively
attractive vision of international copyright regulation. On the
domestic level, the dominant justification for copyright protection is
that such regulation is in society’s best interest. As noted above,
copyright protection not only enables copyright owners to satisfy
their interest in controlling the use of, and gaining revenue from the
192. See generally WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 37-70 (2003); Stanley M. Besen & Leo
J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property
Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 5 (1991).
193. Gene M. Grossman & Edwin L.C. Lai, International Protection of
Intellectual Property¸ 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1635, 1636-37 (2004).
194. See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011
ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? (2015).
195. MERGES, supra note 194, at 95.
196. See generally DRASSINOWER, supra note 194, at 145-87
197. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSIC OF ETHICS (3d ed. 1886)
(exemplifying that “[e]very action is right which in itself, or in the maxim on
which it proceeds, is such that it can coexist along with the freedom of the will of
each and all in action, according to a universal law”).
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use of the work, but also benefits others in society who enjoy the
new works. However, this does not negate the fact that copyright
protection also costs those who otherwise could use the work freely,
and the legal system which must enforce copyright standards. The
dominant economic-utilitarian belief is that copyright ought to
maximize society’s interests (or preferences). It is likely that
society’s interests will be maximized if domestic copyright provides
enough reward to copyright owners to induce creation.198 Any
protection above and beyond that which is necessary to bring forth
the work creates the aforementioned costs without any of the
benefits. Some international copyright standards aid this purpose.199
If copyright owners cannot derive financial reward from foreign
markets, it is likely that their creative incentives would be
suboptimal, and the interests of the national society would be
minimized. By agreeing on some worldwide minimum standards of
copyright protection, states can ensure their authors are adequately
compensated and thus the interests of states are enhanced.200 But,
those minimum standards must not damage the fundamental purpose
copyright serves: maximizing the interests of society. If minimum
standards are high enough to prevent socially valuable uses and
future creation, then the regulation has undercut the very purpose it
ought to serve. For this reason, international copyright law must
bring about the “appropriate balance” of rights and obligations. It
must ensure authors receive adequate financial incentive to create,
but not go beyond that point.
The Balanced Interpretation more effectively achieves this
purpose than the Traditional Interpretation. In particular, the
Traditional Interpretation of the Three-Step Test prevents states from
limiting copyright protection when doing so is necessary to
maximize society’s interests. The Traditional Interpretation of the
first step (“certain special cases”), which requires limitations to be
both “clearly defined” and “narrow in scope,” threatens the ability of
states to enact open-ended limitations necessary for calibrating

198. See, e.g., Mark Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual
Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1, 49-75 (1997).
199. Grossman & Lai, supra note 193, at 1635 (discussing different examples of
international copyright agreements).
200. Id.
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copyright in the Information Age.201 As explained in Part I, states
increasingly need a flexible, open-ended doctrinal limitations that
will allow courts to exempt new uses of copyrighted material from
licensing requirements as they arise.202 To the extent that the
Traditional Interpretation casts doubt on such exceptions, it threatens
to prevent states from achieving the appropriate, interest-maximizing
balance. On the other hand, the “reasonable foreseeability” approach
suggested by the Declaration, achieves this goal.203 Under this
approach, the scope of limitations must be foreseeable but only
“reasonably” so.204 The “reasonableness” assessment takes into
account both the value of predictability and the value of flexibility
such that open-ended limitations are helpful in achieving the right
balance.205
Likewise, the Balanced Interpretation’s approach to steps two and
three is more likely to achieve the appropriate balance of interests
than the Traditional Interpretation. The second step requirement that
limitations not conflict with a “normal exploitation” of the work has
traditionally prevented states from enacting limits which would
create any actual or potential, present or future, economic
competition with the copyright holder.206 This has the negative effect
of preventing limitations that create any competition with the
copyright holder.207 However, some competition is clearly desirable
and necessary to ensure the copyright owner does not enjoy an
unrestrained monopoly. If a state wishes to balance the interests of
creators and users, copyright must enable some competition,
providing that competition does not undercut creative incentives.208
201. See supra Part II.A and notes 56-71.
202. See supra Part II.A.
203. Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 495.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 491 (noting that this clarification is in line with a realization in certain
civil law jurisdictions that a traditional preference for a narrow interpretation of all
exceptions and limitations may not always be appropriate in the contexts in which
copyright works are exploited today; also noting that the first “step” of the “test”
does not preclude legislatures from introducing or retaining “open-ended”
limitations and exceptions, so long as the scope of such provisions is reasonably
foreseeable).
206. See id. at 492 (describing the evolution of new business models within the
realm of intellectual property).
207. Lemley, supra note 198, at 49-68.
208. See id. (describing the relationship between competition and prices
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The Traditional Interpretation prevents states from striking this
balance by restricting all competition with the copyright owner. By
contrast, the Balanced Interpretation’s requirement that competition
is only unlawful when it is unreasonable permits competition when
there is no clear reason to believe that such exceptions and
limitations undercut creative incentives. For example, copying
legitimately acquired works for purely private uses209 – e.g., creating
back-up copies of works, or moving digital files from a computer to
a smart phone – is unlikely to have a meaningful effect on creative
incentives,210 and thus would not create “unreasonable economic
competition.211” Similarly, under the third step requirement that
limitations not cause “unreasonable prejudice to legitimate interests,”
the Balanced Interpretation explicitly calls for third party interests to
be taken into account when deciding what is unreasonable.212
Accordingly, the Balanced Interpretation is more likely to facilitate
limitations which, when all social interests are taken into account,
achieves the right balance.
Finally, while the “comprehensive overall assessment”
requirement is of dubious “fit,”213 it is important to note that this
requirement would nevertheless help achieve the right balance of
interests. Currently, each step highlights a factor, such as legal
certainty or normal expectations, which law makers must take into
account when assessing whether a limitation furthers the public
interest or not. However, while a proper assessment of the public
interest cannot be complete without assessing the limitation’s effects
on these criteria, it does not follow that a limitation must pass each
concerning property owners).
209. See generally Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U.
COLO. L. REV. 653, 654 (2005) (describing changing social and political norms as
they relate to intellectual property law and regulation of its use).
210. See Stanley M. Besen & Sheila Nataraj Kirby, Private Copying,
Appropriability, and Optimal Copying Royalties, 32 J. L. & ECON. 255, 256-57
(1989) (noting that society may be better off by restricting copying because of its
higher social marginal cost); see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of
Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 882 (2001) (arguing that prohibiting private
copying serves no purpose but to enrich copyright owners).
211. Besen & Kirby, supra note 210, at 256-57; Lunney, Jr., supra note 210, at
882.
212. Munich Declaration, supra note 104, at 495.
213. See supra Part III.B.1.
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step to be in the public interest. It is highly possible that a limitation
fails to pass one step, and yet overall, still may be in the public
interest. The clearest example of such a case is the Fair Use
doctrine. The lack of legal certainty provided by such doctrines is a
factor against finding a limitation to be in the society’s interest, but
nevertheless the doctrine may ensure a balance of interests conducive
to the public interest because of the strong benefit it provides to
countries trying to define the “legitimate interests” of authors in the
twenty-first century. As a result, the Balanced Interpretation
construes the interrelationship between the steps in a way that allows
the “public interest” value to be the most important criterion in
assessing a limitation, to which the steps are crucial guides but not
themselves the ultimate arbiters.
3. Summary
In summary, while textualist and intentionalist Interpretivist
approaches do not yield enough support to proclaim the Balanced
Interpretation the right interpretation of the Three-Step Test, a
particularly strong teleological approach, such as the one adopted by
Legal Interpretivists on the domestic level, would support such
doctrinal claims. The Balanced Interpretation broadly fits enough of
the legal sources to be an interpretation, rather than mere reinvention,
of the Test, while promoting an appropriate balance of interests
conducive to maximizing society’s interests. To those inclined to
adopt the teleological Interpretive Argument, this enables a response
to some of the traditionalist criticisms.
Firstly, traditionalists argue that the Balanced Interpretation is not
a faithful interpretation at all, but is in fact a normative reform
proposal in disguise.214 To which, the response of supporters of the
Balanced Interpretation adopting the Interpretivist Argument should
be that theirs is not a re-imagining of the Test, but is a reconstruction
of the Test in light of the most normatively attractive justifications
for international copyright law today. The appeal to normative value
is not a barefaced attempt to change international legal norms, but is
justified on the plausible grounds that normatively attractive
purposes are internal to the interpretive process. In effect, the
response must be that the traditionalists adopt a thin and
214. Supra notes 129-130 and accompanying text.
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unpersuasive vision of international legal interpretation.
Second, while traditionalists argue that the WTO approach is
conclusive,215 supporters of the Balanced Interpretation can claim
that the WTO panel erred in their interpretation of the Three Step
Test. The Interpretation which we, potentially, should follow is that
which gives effect to the normatively defensible objects and
purposes of international copyright law, and thus shows the Test in
its best light. The WTO approach arguably fails that standard and
thus is not consistent with the best constructive interpretation.
Finally, not only does the Interpretive Argument provide some
potential ammunition to those supporting the Balanced Interpretation
as a doctrinal matter, arguably Legal Interpretivism is already, albeit
implicitly, the jurisprudential and methodological approach they
adopt. Ronald Dworkin famously described how lawyers adopt an
“Interpretive Attitude” towards legal sources, and this explained how
legal interpretations evolved over time. This evolution comes in three
stages.216 First, at a “pre-interpretive stage” lawyers identify the
“tentative content” of the relevant rule.217 Second is an “interpretive
stage” wherein “the interpreter settles on some general justification
for the main elements of the practice identified at the pre-interpretive
stage.”218 At this stage, interpreters “impose meaning on the
institution” and crucially ask not for the historical justification but
the most normatively defensible justification. And finally is a “postinterpretive or reforming stage” wherein the interpreter “adjusts his
sense of what the practice “really” requires so as better to serve the
justification he accepts at the interpretive stage.”219
Arguably, in the last twenty years, the Interpretive Attitude has
taken hold in international copyright. In 2000, at a
pre-interpretive stage, international copyright lawyers tentatively
interpreted the Three-Step Test in a restrictive and protectionist
manner. But the occurrence of an “interpretive stage” in the twentyfirst century lead international copyright lawyers to a different
justification for international copyright law: harmonizing the balance
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Supra note 134 and accompanying text.
Dworkin, supra note 26, at 65.
Id. at 65-66.
Id. at 66.
Id.
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of rights and obligations in a way that roughly maximize society’s
interests. The revised interpretations of the Three-Step Test are the
product of the “post-interpretive or reforming stage” and attempt to
bring the rule into conformity with this more attractive purpose.

IV. CHALLENGES AND ALTERNATIVE
ARGUMENTS
This Essay articulates the Interpretivist Argument in favor of a
more balanced interpretation of the Three-Step Test. While textualist
and intentionalist approaches to treaty interpret fail to provide
support for the Balanced Interpretation’s formal-doctrinal claim, a
rather strongly teleological approach, such as that found domestically
in the theory of Legal Interpretivism, would support such
conclusions. However, this Interpretive Argument is vulnerable to
attack. This Part briefly considers theoretical objections to the
Interpretive Argument. Should the Interpretive Argument fail, then
presumably the Balanced Interpretation’s doctrinal claim also fails.
This Part therefore also considers alternative arguments (the
Normative Argument and the Discretion Argument) that could be
made in favor of the Balanced Interpretation, while highlighting the
problems associated with those arguments.
One may dispute the grounds on which the Interpretivist argument
rests. One may argue that normative value is never relevant to
interpreting international copyright provisions, or alternatively, that
it is only relevant when that normative value has been clearly agreed
upon and incorporated into law (through, for example, treaty
ratification). This line of criticism is particularly important because
very few scholars have proposed or defended Interpretivist accounts
of international law, let alone international copyright law. In part,
this is likely because Interpretivism’s chief proponent, Ronald
Dworkin, was primarily concerned with explaining the attributes of
law in a single political community and, furthermore, concentrated
his attention on Anglo-American common law systems.220 It is
possible, therefore, to argue that, in the absence of a serious defense
of Interpretivism at the international level, we must assume the
Positivist theories are more accurate and thus moral value plays a
220. See Jason A. Beckett, Behind Relative Normativity: Rules and Process as
Prerequisites of Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 627, 634-37 (2001).
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very limited role in interpreting international legal sources.
This criticism is, however, unpersuasive.
Fundamentally,
Interpretivism is a conceptual theory of the nature of law. It applies
to all law, whether that be domestic or international. Accordingly,
scholars are now starting to develop Interpretivist accounts of
international law.
Basak Cali, has argued effectively that
Interpretivism is relevant to the theoretical and normative debates
about international law.221 Meanwhile, John Tasioulas supports an
Interpretivist theory of customary international law, in which he
argues that the “ethical appeal of a candidate norm figures among the
criteria for determining whether it is a valid norm of CIL [Customary
International Law].”222 And, in a posthumously published essay,
Ronald Dworkin argued for a partially moralized conception of
international law, in which states have a moral duty to accept
constraints on their sovereignty that would enhance their political
legitimacy.223
Nevertheless, if one disagrees with the Interpretive Argument, two
alternative lines of argument are open to those who favor a more
permissive Three-Step Test. First is the “Normative Argument.”
This is, in effect, to concede that the Balanced Interpretation is not an
accurate description of the law and to argue that international law
norms ought to be changed. This argument benefits from the role of
state practice as a source of international law. Arguably, the process
of changing the Three-Step Test would not require action as drastic
as a treaty modification. Instead, states could simply adopt and
practice a more permissive interpretation of the Test with the hope
that over time the volume of state practice would alter existing legal
norms.
Second is the “Discretion” Argument. This argument involves
221. !a-ak 'ali, On Interpretivism and International Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L.
805, 821-22 (2009) (juxtaposing positivism and interpretivism).
222. John Tasioulas, Customary International Law and the Quest for Global
Justice, in THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW: LEGAL, HISTORICAL, AND
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 307, 310 (2006).
223. Ronald Dworkin, A New Philosophy for International Law, 41 PHIL. &
PUB. AFFAIRS 2 (2013); see Adam S. Chilton, A Reply to Dworkin’s New Theory of
International Law, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 105, 109 (2013) (articulating
Dworkin’s point that states have an obligation to citizens to mitigate the failures of
state sovereignty).
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accepting that the Three-Step Test has very little settled meaning.
Rather, this argument views the wording of the Three-Step Test as
ambiguous in large part because its drafters did not want to fully
decide the issue of what exceptions and limitations are permissible,
but instead kicked the can down the road, allowing states to figure
the issue out on a more case-by-case basis. Following this line of
reasoning, both the Traditional and Balanced Interpretations are
legitimate, plausible, interpretations not ruled out by the Three-Step
Test. Judges and policymakers thus have discretion to adopt
whichever interpretation they prefer. The weakness of this argument
is that it gives up on the formalist reasoning that the Balanced
Interpretation typically adopts. No longer could supporters of the
Balanced Interpretation claim that the WTO panel somehow made a
legal error. The most supporters could claim is the WTO panel made
a different policy judgment, which it had discretion to do. Thus, it is
only the Interpretive Argument which supports the strongest claims
made by advocates of the Balanced Interpretation

V. CONCLUSION
The interpretation of the Three-Step Test is one of the most hotly
contested issues in international economic regulation. This Essay
analyzed the doctrinal claim made by the Balanced Interpretation
(i.e. that the Balanced Interpretation is the correct legal interpretation
of the Three-Step Test) and asked whether it can be defended. It
argued that such a claim could not be supported by two main
approaches to treaty interpretation – textualism and intentionalism –
but may be supported if one adopts a particularly strong teleological
approach to interpretation, such as that developed by Ronald
Dworkin and Legal Interpretivists on the domestic level.
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